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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
UINTAH FREIGHT LINES, a corporation; SALT LAKE TRANSFER
CO~IP A~TY, a co-partnership; and
ASHWORTH TRANSFER COMPANY, a co-partnership,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 7420

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH and GUY PRICHAR.D,

Defendants.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
To eliminate duplicity, defendants concede that the statements in plaintiffs' brief to the middle of page 4 are generally
true. It is submitted that the balance of plaintiffs' Statement
of Facts, constitutes counsel's paraphrasing of facts tending
to reflect the case in the best possible light for plaintiffs. It
is further submitted that a casual reading of the record indicates that much other pertinent evidence, possibly not so helpful
to plaintiffs, has been omitted.
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The compelling fact that between July 19, 1948 and July
7: 1949, defendant Prichard had been granted some 17 temporary permits to haul commodities outside of his former
authority (R. 43), but inside the authority unanimously granted
by the Commission in this case, is discounted with a flourish
by plaintiffs on page 8 of their brief, with the somewhat accusatory generalization that the (<Protestants have taken the
position that these were wrongfully issued by the Commission
and that such do not constitute any evidence of convenience
2nd necesity.'' We suggest that the Commission is undeserving
of such a sweeping indictment. Particularly is this true in
view of the fact that of all the counsel named on plaintiffs'
brief, only Mr. Pugsley personally appeared at the hearing
of this matter.
In passing, it appears significant to us that of about 40
carriers or interested parties notified of the hearing (R. 7),
only 8 entered appearances. Three of these, the Barton Truck
Lines, the Union Pacific and Uintah Freight Lines (one of
+he appellants), were represented at said hearing by neither
counsel nor other person. Three are plaintiffs herein, and
two, the Carbon Freight Line and Rio Grande Motorwaysthe only two having offices and terminals along with Prichard
in Carbon County-are not appellants here.
Although plaintiffs declare wrongful the issuance of 17
temporary permits to Prichard within a year, we must insist
that the Commission did not act ·wrongfully, but rather in
consonance with the exigencies of a general situation, and
that approval of these temporary permits is strong evidenct
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justifying the granting of Prichard's application, and demonstrating convenience and necessity.
Although the Court, in examining the record, will find
tnuch evidence omitted in plaintiffs' brief, we beg indulgence
to supply some of said omissions here, all of which tend to
;ustify the order of the Commission, which, according to a
]ong line of authority handed down by this Court, should not
be disturbed.
Mr. Prichard testified that quite often he was called upon
to furnish the service requested in his application (R. 67),
11nd that in many cases he had received temporary permits to
do so (R. 68) . On~e he was requested in the middle of the
night to perform such service (R. 71). People would call him
for such service most any hour of the night (R. 73). He was
called one evening with a request for next day service; that
he satisfactorily performed the same, and did so in every
case (R. 76). He has aided Carbon Freight Lines, one of
the protestants, on occasion in unloading vault doors, and a
generator, the facilities of that company being inadequate
to perform the service (R. 79) . He has also assisted the Rio
Grande Motorways, another protestant not appealing here,
in hauling casing, the job requiring Prichard's special equipment (R. 80-81). Prichard has an office in Carbon County,
maintains a telephone, has his number in the telephone directory, has ads in the directory and newspapers and maintains
a warehouse at Thompson, Utah, where some of his equipment
is stationed (R. 82). With the exception of the Uintah
Freight, none of the appellantes maintains such service in the
Eastern Utah area. Prichard also maintains a business contact
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in Vernal (R. 83). A temporary permit was granted him
;vithin a month before the hearing (R. 84). A Mr. Young
called him requesting that he haul cement from Devil' s Slide
( R. 90-91) . He hauled transformers to Salt Lake on Carbon
Freight Line's permit (R. 92). Carbon Freight, a protestant,
does not have necessary equipment to haul large tanks or
caterpillar tractors (R. 98) and did not have necessary equipment to unload vault doors, which required Prichard's assistance (R. 108), and that Prichard has assisted Carbon
Freight in other instances (R. 109). A Mr. Gamber requested
Prichard to haul some large pipes for him, and upon being
advised Prichard had no temporary permit, called long distance to Salt Lake and the Salt Lake Transfer Co., protestant
and appellant here, delayed transportation of the commodity
from a Thursday to the following Tuesday (R. 112-113, 124,
167). It was necessary for Prichard to unload the commodity
because this carrier had no facilities for unloading (R. 114).
Mr. Gamber testified that Eastern Utah was developing
(R. 115), that he had witnessed the birth and growth of Horse
Canyon, the Kaiser Fuel Co., and the boom of the Sunnyside
J\1ine, dormant before the War (R. 1 i6); that Prichard had
hauled a large tank for his ~ompany and that his service \vas
satisfactory (R. 117). He further stated that last January
\vas the best month in his company's history (R. 122) and that
during shut-down periods, heavy hauling was necessary for
revan1ping the plant (R. 123); that it would be a great convenience if Prichard could render the service requested, particularly since the Salt Lake Transfer, one of the appellants,
had not known the destination for delivery in the instance
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experienced by Gamber with that company (R. 126, 128), and
that he \vas inclined to give Prit l \ard the haul since he knew
the district (R. 127). .
Mrs. Leonard, District Representative for Robison
Jvfachinery Co., covering Carbon, En1ery, Grand, San Juan
and Uintah counties, who was well acquainted with Eastern
lJtah, testified that he believed there was a definite need for
someone in that area to .do heavy equipment hauling and that
his customers frequently inquired about hauling and the cost
thereof, and that it would be a matter of convenience to him
(R. 130-135).
Mr. Nielson, a contractor, having need for transporting
of heavy equipment, has used Prichard and his work was satjsfactory, other than the wait involved in obtaining permits
(R. 136). He stated there was a need for hauling heavy
equipment from Salt Lake to the area (R. 137), that there
\Vas new activity in the area in coal (Kaiser Mine) and in the
uranium industry, which latter was definitely growing (R.
J 38) ; that it was a matter of convenience to have Prichard haul
for him, even if he had to wait to obtain a special permit (R.
1.40-141), and that from his life-long experience in the area
he believed it would be a matter of convenience to the p~ople
in the area to have Prichard's .requested service (R. 141) .
Also, that the canal company with which he was connected,
had had trouble with a shipment of pipe hauled by Ashworth,
one of the appellants, requiring .the employment of Prichard
to .pull .the Ashworth equipment in, and to complete the haul.
A~hworth' s equipment also failed to have adequate unloading
7
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equipment (R. 145-146) and had too small a truck for the
load (R. 147).
Mr. Larsen, a hardware dealer, stated that on the basis
of past experience, it would be a matter of convenience to
use Mr. Prichard's service in any hauling from points outside
of the area into the area (R. 151), and in his past experie~ce
it would have been a matter of considerable inconvenience
if he had not been able to use Prichard's service, both fro1n a
standpoint of time and expense (R. 153).
Mr. Jackson, a coal dealer, testified as to an instance where
(:arbon Freight, in delivering heavy equipment,. was not equipped to unload it, and dropped a heavy generator, damaging it
(R. 187), after which Prichard was called upon with his
equipment to load and transport the equipment (R. 188),
and that in the future it would be a matter of convenience to
him to have Prichard haul for him from Salt Lake to his
property (R. 189) ; that Prichard had heavy equipment available that other carriers in the area did not have (R. 196); that
there is an advantage in having such equipment in the area
(R. 198) ; that rail shipment out of the area is too slo'v
(R. 200).
Mr. Campbell of Vernal, testified that he \vas inconvenienced and lost $200 because of a shipment delayed by
.A.shworth, one of the appellants (R. 205) ; that the deadhead
vlould be smaller with Prichard in hauling frotn the area to
any other place in the State (R. 209) and that it would be a
1natter of convenience to have Prichard haul heavy equiprr1ent
from the area to points o~tside of the area (R. 210).
8
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Mr. Sims, Manager of Salt Lake Transfer, one of the
appellants, admitted the bulk of his equipment was in Salt
Lake (R. 164); that he had no office in Eastern Utah and that
anyone from the area desiring his services would have to write
him, wire him, or telephone him (R. 177); that there was
increased activity in the area (R. 180) ; that there was greater
activity in Vernal, Monticello and Moab (R. 183).
Mr. Ashworth, one of the appellants, admitted that the
Gilsonite industry has developed in Eastern Utah in the past
:, years (R. 218-219) and that oil development in Uintah
\vill increase, and that there will be an increase in hauling
there (R. 219) .
Mr. Smith, Manager for Rio Grande Motorways, protestant, but not an appellant, admitted that his company loaded
only pieces up to 12,000 pounds and that it would have to
rent a· crane from someone to unload it at its destination (R.
228) ; that they had loading equipment only at Salt Lake, and
none in the area, and that they had no facilities to set up
rnachinery (R. 231); that they could not transport a caterpillar of overall width (R. 232), and that he would have to
make extraordinary arrangements for unloading anything
over 5 tons out of the Salt Lake area (R. 233).
No one appeared for or testified for Uintah Freight Lines,
one of the appellants here.
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ARGUMENT

I.
, : THERE IS ABUNDANT COMPETENT EVIDEI~CE
IN THE RECORD TO SUSTAIN THE COMMISSIOI~)S
FINDINGS AND ORDER THAT PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
l!'"ND NECESSITY REQUIRE THE EXTENSION OF ..1\PPLICANT'S AUTHORITY.
We feel that the first four Assignrnents of Errors reached
py the plaintiffs raise but one question; i. e., is there sufficient
e,vidence in the record to sustain the action of the Commission.
We will therefore treat plaintiffs' first four points under this
one h~ading.
Regardless of the generalizations of plaintiffs, it is re·spectfully submitted that on the whole record there is. an
abundance of substantial evidence to support the Commission's
findings and order. The long line of this Court's decisions,
the last of which seems to be the Goodrich case, makes useless
the citation of authority for the proposition that the Com·Jnission' s findings will not be disturbed unless not based .on
'any substantial evidence. None of the generalizations n1ent.ioned is a substitute for the unanimous findings of -a Comlnission experienced in the matters which are the subject of
·this case.
At this juncture we wish to point out that plaintiffs
indulge in an inconsistency when, on page 12 of their brief
they qliote the report of the Commission which states public
'Convenience arid necessity require transportation between. points
i"f/ Utah where the origin or destination of the movement ~is
10
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in Uintah, Duchesne, Grand, Carbon, Emery, Wayne and San
Juan counties, basing its order thereon, and then on page 13
state that Hthe Commission made no finding that any area
c,f ·the State of Utah other than Wayne County required the
service of Guy Prichard outside his original six counties.
Before discussing other parts of plaintiffs' brief and the
cases involved, we suggest at this point that the Goodrich case,
cited on p. 15 of plaintiffs' brief with approval, is ( 1) not
analgo us to our case and ( 2) does not support plaintiffs'
theory that the Commission should give existing carriers first
chance to satisfy convenience and necessity. This Court is
thoroughly familiar with the case, and we simply point out
that a contract carier problem was involved there, not a common
carrier problem as here. Furthermore, it was obvious that
granting contract carrier permits to serve only four shippers
was not in the public interest, which required the broade~~·
service supplied by a common carrier. Even though the Uintah
Freight Lines offered to furnish additional service after the
,i pplicants had filed their petition, the Commission sustained
· t"he Uintah' s protest, and this Hon. Court upheld the Corn·Jnlsston' s refusal to grant the authority requested, the Court
saytng:
((The Commission is in a much more favorable position to determine the benefits and detriments of the
two competing systems than is this court."
The same Uintah line, which espoused that decision upholding
the wisdom of the Commission's decision, now would ignore
and discount the quoted passage and prefer to say, as it did
·in its brief on page 8 that the ((Protestants have taken the poll
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sition that these ( 17 temporary permited granted to Prichard)
were tvrongfully issued by the Comtnission and that such do
not constitute any evidence of convenience and necessity.''
This is the same sort of inconsistency as heretofore mentioned.
As to the plaintiffs' contention that existing carriers should
have first chance to satisfy the requirements of convenience
and necessity (p. 16 Brief), our Court has spoken on the
s11;bject, not in the Goodrich case, but in Salt Lake & Utah R.
Corp. vs. P.S.C., 106 Ut. 403 P(2) 647, 1944, 'vhen it said:
(Whether or not the existing common motor carrier
should have been given a further opportunity to furnish the required services before allowing a competing
motor carrier to enter the field is a matter of policy
which is entirely within the province of the Public
Service Commission.',
t

On p. 16 of plaintiffs' brief a quotation from Utah Light
8{ Traction vs. P.S.C., 101 Ut. 99, 118 P(2) 683, is set forth,
apparently to convince that our Court is committed to a principle
that if there is existing adequate service, there should be no
duplication thereof by granting new authority. Attention is
respectfully called to the language quoted and the significant
phraseology that condemns a duplication only that rrunfairly
~nterferes" with existing carriers. In our case the Commission
most obviously found that there would be no unfair interference
\vith existing carriers. We can agree with counsel's o\vn state!nent on p. 17 of the brief, that factually, the very case they
cite with approval presents ((not at all the problem which faces
the Commission and the Court in the case at bar.n Better
had counsel quoted other excerpts from the case, such as:
12
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{{The paramount consideration is the benefit to the
public, the promotion and advancement of its growth,''
and:
HI£ the Commission's determination finds justification
in the evidence, it is not a law question and we cannot
review or modify it or set it aside,''
or:
{{True, existing carriers benefit from the restricted
competition, but this is merely incidental in the solution of the problem of securing adequate and permanent service. The public interest is paran1ount."
Obviously the Public Service Commission adopted the
philosophy of the language last quoted, based upon the evidence before it.
A word must be said about McCarthy vs. P.S.C._, 111 Ut.
--189, 184 P ( 2) 220, cited by plaintiffs. We respectfully submit
that this case is not in point. All o£ the ev_idence conclusive! y
indicated that the applicants wanted to continue as, and intended to hold themselves out as contract carriers, not as
common carriers, but made their application for common carrier
rights under a mistaken belief that they were required so to
do in order to comply with the law and perform the strictly
contract carrier duties they had been pursuing. There is no
semblance of similarity in fact or fancy to our case, there being
3 complete absence of evidence to support applicants in the
McCarthy case. The language of the Court seemed to indicate
that there may have been a different result had the applicants,
like Prichard, expressed a willingness and ability to perform
the requested service. The Court quoted approvingly from
Fuller-Topance vs. P.S.C., 99 Ut. 28, 96 P(2) 723, with respect
to necessity and convenience, in apparent disagreement with
13
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plaintiffs' contention that .present adequacy of service should
eliminate granting of any new authority, when it said:
t(But a service is not necessarily adequate because
the community can (get by,' can conduct its business
without further or additional service. To be adequate
the services must meet the requirements of the public
convenience and necessity in such a way that the·needs,
growth and welfare of the community are reasonably
met and supplied."
It is submitted that there is ample evidence in our case
upon which the Commission's findings can be sustained, fron1
the standpoint of the needs, growth and development in the
Eastern Utah area.
On pp. 23-24 of their brief, plaintiffs have unwittingly
1nade · an inaccurate statement not supported by the record.
After stating, that the protestants introduced testimony that
iheir service had been satisfactory, counsel states that all of
the evidendce indicated such protestants were able to render
additional services within the area. Attention is directed to
the fact that Uintah Freight Lines, appellant here, had neither
counsel nor other representation at the hearing, and offered
no evidence whatever, except by filing a financial statement
and list of equipment.
In passing, reference to language in Mulcahy vs. P.S.C.J
101, Ut. 243, 117 P(2) 298, may be apropos in generalizing
as to the attitude of this Court toward ( 1) review of the Comtnission' s findings, ( 2) convenience and necessity, and ( 3)
~vhether existin~ carriers should have any pre-etnptive rights:
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Hit is not required that the facts found by the Commission be conclusively established, nor even that they
be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. If there
is in the record competent evidence from which a
reasonable mind could believe or conclude that a certain
fact existed, a finding of such fact finds justification
in the evidence and we cannot disturb it.
ttThe statute should be so construed and applied as
to encourage rather than retard mechanical ap.d other
improvements in appliances and in the quality of the
service rendered the public, and should look to the
future as well as the present, providing not only for
present urgent need, but such as may be reasonably
anticipated from the probable growth of population,
industry and community development.
t(Having given due consideration to those matters
the Commission determines whether the existing carriers or a new one should be permitted to render the
proposed service. If the Commission's determination.
finds justification in the evidence, it is not a law question and we cannot review or modify it or set it aside."
And apropos of plaintiffs' implied contention that Prichard
should not be allowed enlarged authority because of interferencewith plaintiff's rights, our Court in Union Pacific vs.
P.S.C. 1 103 Ut. 459 135 P(2) 915, stated:
ttln the exercise of its power to grant or withhold
certificates of convenience and necessity, questions of
impairment of vested or property rights cannot very
well arise. No one can have a vested right to be free
from competition, to have a monopoly against the
public. And unless some justifiable question arises,
unless some point is juridically present, this court will
not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative
tribunal, charged by law with carrying out matters of
non-judicial character."

15
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A point is made in plaintiffs' brief that since no witnesses
appeared from many counties in Utah, there is no evidence
of need for any service in such counties. Counsel might as
well have said that there were no witnesses from the hundreds
of cities. and towns in Utah and therefore authority to haul
to such cities and towns could not be granted because of lack
of evidence. · The Commission, through its experience and
~rom facts presented to it, is justified in making orders that
apply to areas of the State-in this case, the area represented
by the counties in which Prichard has heretofore been confined, as related to the area of the State outside the ambit of
his former authority. The Commission may authoritatively
conclude that service into an area from various points outside
the area justifies the granting 'Of authority to cover contiguous
or similar points outside the area, to satisfy a public need
and convenience. There is testimony in our case, given by
competent witnesses, whom the Commission is entitled to be]ieve, that public convenience would be served if Prichard's
authority were extended to include movements originating
in the Eastern Utah area, destined for points generally situated
outside the area, and to include movements originating
generally outside of the area, destined for points inside the
area. Such testimony, coupled with all other evidence adduced,
.l ustifies the Commission in designating the counties within
which Prichard may initiate movements, for consignment
outside said counties, and in designating all other counties
of the State as points where a movement may initiate providing
its destination is found in the counties assigned to Prichard.
A.ny other interpretation, as has been suggested, would burden
an applicant with the necessity of bringing witnesses not only

16
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from each county, but from each city, town and hamlet in the
State.
Plaintiffs refer on p. 14 of their brief, to Sec. 76-5-18,
!i.C.A 1943, which states what the Commission may do in a
given case, included in which is a discretionary authority to
issue certificates for less authority than that requested. The
Commission exercised such discretionary authority in this
very case. Prichard asked to extend the circle of counties in
'vhich he could operate to Daggett, Wayne, Piute, Garfield,
Sanpete, Kane, Sevier and Wasatch. The Commission denied
~uch request with respect to 7 of the 8 counties requested,
granting permission only in Wayne County. It is respectfully
submitted that the Commission must have weighed the evidence
carefully, and the contention of plaintiffs that the Commission
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in this case, has no merit.
Had its decision been arbitrary and capricious, there seems to
be no logical reason why it should have excluded the seven
counties mentioned.

II.
THE COMMISSION DID MAKE A FINDING AS TO
TI-IE ADEQUACY OF THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE PRESENTLY RENDERED AND AVAILABLE TO
THE PUBLIC.
We think it should be pointed out that the authority
granted to the applicant involves the transportation of comtnodities requiring special handling and that the record clearly
1"/
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shows that this service is not furnished by the regular common
carriers operating in the territory involved.
Plaintiffs quote a portion of 76-5-18 Utah Code Annotated 1943, and contend that the Commission failed to make
a finding that the existing transportation facilities are inadequate. We think it proper to quote more extensively from
that section in order to show what is required of the Comn1iss1.on- thereunder.

'( * * * Before granting a certificate to a common motor carrier, the commission shall take into consideration
the financial ability of the applicant to properly perform the service sought under the certificate and also
the character of the highway over which said common
motor carrier proposes to operate and the effect thereon, and upon the travelling public using the same,
and also the existing transportation facilities in the
territory proposed to be served. If the Commission
finds that the applicant is financially unable to properly
perform the service sought under the certificate, or
that the highway over which he proposes to operate
is already sufficiently burdened with traffic, or that the
granting of the certificate applied for will be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the state
of Utah, the commission shall not grant such certificate."
-The Commission found that there is a considerable demand
for the transportation facilities covered by the authority granted
to the applicant and that the highways over which applicant
proposes to operate are not unduly burdened with traffic and
that the granting of the application, as restricted, will not
be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the State
cr the territory affected (R. 22). We submit that these Findings
amply saisfy the requirements of Section 76-5-18. That section
18
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does not require an express finding that existing facilities are
inadequate. It does require that the Commission take into
consideration the adequacy of such facilities, which they obviously did. However, the Finding of the Commission that
rhere is an unsatisfied demand and that the highways are not
unduly burdened and that the granting of the application will
not be detrimental to the best interests of the public, is in
fact a :finding that the existing facilities are inadequate. If
they \vere adequate there would be no unsatisfied demand.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that an examination
of the record, in light of all the circumstances and evidence,
and a review of the authorities our own court has handed do\vn,
lead inevitably and unequivocally to the conclusion that the
Commission did not err in granting to Prichard the restricted
authority reflected in its order in this case.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General

MARK K. BOYLE,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Public Service Commission

F. HENRI HENRIOD,
Attorney for Guy Prichard
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